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ST JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
ARTICLE

78-

PROCEEIING AGAINST BODY OR OFFICER

CPLR 7801.: Supreme court issues order in nature of iandamus
directing justice court to set a trial date.
Article 78 of the CPLR, which embodies the common-law writs
of mandamus, certiorari and prohibition, was intended to alter the
form rather than the substance of the writs.1 9 3

Since these writs

are discretionary remedies, they will not lie where another remedy
is provided by law. 94 Mandamus will issue where the relief
requested involves a direction to an official or judicial body to
per-form a ministerial act which does not require the exercise of
judgment or discretion.' 95 Although an order may be directed
to compel an official or an inferior court to perform an administrative function, it may not contain a direction controlling judicial
judgment or discretion. 9 6 Mandamus, however, will lie to compel
performance of a discretionary act where refusal to perform such
an act is capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable as a matter of law. 9 7
Hence, the court has issued a writ of mandamus substituting its
own determination for that of a planning board which acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when it enacted a zoning ordinance. 98
Under Article 78, the petitioner in Keen v. Mirabile 199 sought
an order in the nature of mandamus directing an acting police
justice to bring his case on for trial. Although petitioner had
served the summons and complaint on February 13, 1965, the case
was transferred to several police justices, each of whom declined
to set a trial date. The respondent tentatively set a trial date,
September 21, 1965, the delay being attributable to his vacation
plans. Upon request of the defendant in the action set down for
trial, a new trial date was set for September 28, 1965. On September 27, respondent granted an indefinite adjournment solely
because he had received a letter, apparently signed by defendant's
physician, stating that defendant was to undergo surgery eighteen
days hence.

'93

7B McKmNNY's CPLR 7801, supp. commentary 11 (1965).

1 CPLR 7801-; see also Kahn v. Backer, 21 App. Div. 2d 171, 249

N.Y.S.2d
572 (1st Dep't 1964).
' 9oPeople ex rel. Elmira Advertiser Ass'n v. Gorman, 169 App. Div. 891,
155 N.Y. Supp. 727 (3d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 222 N.Y. 712, 119 N.E.
113 (1915).
196 E.g., People ex rel. Lewis v. Fowler, 229 N.Y. 84, 127 N.E. 793 (1920);
Knight v. Howell, 262 App. Div. 759, 27 N.Y.S.2d 654 (2d Dep't 1941).
197 Rosenthal v. Stickman, 82 N.Y.S.2d 22 (Sup. Ct Queens County), aff'd
rne.,274 App. Div. 804, 81 N.Y.S.2d 147 (2d Dep't 1948).
198 Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Bd., 1 N.Y.2d 508, 136 N.E2d 827,
154 N.Y.S.2d 849.(1956).
199 48 Misc. 2d 382, 264 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Sup. Ct. RocIdand County 1965).
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The court held that this postponement was a clear case of
arbitrary action resulting in inordinate delay since respondent's
action was based solely upon the contents of the letter, which was
not authenticated, and which failed to specify the nature or degree
of the defendant's illness. The court ordered the case to be tried
on a specific date unless the defendant could supply affidavits
relating to the nature, extent and duration of the illness. It
expressly noted that mandamus will lie to compel an inferior tribunal
to perform a ministerial act.
DoMESTIC RELATIONS LAW

Dor. Rel. Law § 243: Motion for sequestration subsequent to
separation action in which defendant has appeared held
"a rotion in the action."
In

Robinson v. Robinson,20 , a recent first department case,

defendant-husband appeared in and contested a judicial action for
separation. Subsequent to a judgment for plaintiff which provided
for periodic payments of alimony, defendant defaulted, announced
his intention not to comply with the terms of the judgment and
departed to Denmark. Plaintiff thereupon moved, pursuant to
Section 243 of the Domestic Relations Law, for an order of
sequestration. Service was made in New York upon defendant's
attorneys and in Denmark upon defendant personally. In reversing
special term, the first department did not decide the extent of the
authority of defendant's attorneys to represent him as agents after
final judgment, 20' but found the personal service in Denmark to be
sufficient to bring him before the court for the purposes of plaintiff's
motion. The court held that since the defendant appeared in the
separation action, no further original process was necessary to
enforce the judgment.20 2 With a valid basis for jurisdiction, the
mode of service was within the discretion of the trial court,203 and
since the defendant was advised of the relief sought and was given

20024

App. Div. 2d 138, 264 N.Y.S.2d 816 (1st Dep't 1965).

201 Service upon the attorneys who represented a defendant in a matrimonial

action has been held insufficient for the purposes of subsequent contempt proceedings. Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 201 App. Div. 27, 193 N.Y. Supp. 702 (1st
Dep't 1922); Keller v. Keller, 100 App. Div. 325, 91 N.Y. Supp. 528 (1st
Dep't 1905).
202 Accord, Leman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 454
(1932); Karpf v. Karpf, 260 App. Div. 701, 703, 23 N.Y.S.2d 745, 748 (1st
Dep't 1940).
203 See Burstein v. Burstein, 12 Misc. 2d 521, 523, 155 N.Y.S.2d 288, 290
(Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1956), aft'd, 2 App. Div. 2d 879, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996
(Ist Dep't 1957); see also Pitt v. Davison, 37 N.Y. 235, 241 (1867).

